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I. General rules regarding the resolution-making of the general 
assembly 
Sports associations or federacions, which have national federations as their 
members and which are domiciled in Sv.ri.tzerland, ru:e associations witbin the mesning of 
Art. 60 - 79 CC. Within each organisation, the general assembly is tb.e supreme corporate 
body of the association (Art. 64 cq. Tue general assembly drafts and adopts the statutes, 
including the aJlocation of powers (Art. 65 CC). Tue genera.l assembly has the power to 
increase its own powers at will (Art. 65 CC) or to assign powers to the executive body and 
et.her bodies. Tue general assembly elects the committee and other bodies of the 
association. The rules regaxding decision-maki.ng and elections in the general assembly are 
paramount to the function of the general assembly as the supreme body of the association 
and thus a major aspect of the association gover.nance. These rules are intended to ensure 
that all members a:i.n exercise their membership rights properly and that the decis.ion-
making and the elections with.in the association are free of undue .influences. In this 
respect, regard must also be had to Art. 75 CC. Tbis article allows challenges to resolurions 
of the general assembly in court if such resolurions « infri.nge the law or the articles of 
association >>. A certain formality and unambiguousness in the procedure of elections and 
decision-maki.ng is also necessarily required ; a member must be easily able to identify and 
determ.ine whether a resolution of tb.e gener:tl assembly is one which can be challenged in 
Court. 
The legal rules conceming this supreme body of the association are found in 
Art. 64 - 68 CC. 'These are very general and contain only a few formal rules such as tb.e 
notice rules .in Art. 67 par. 3 CC, the rules regaxding conflicts of .interests in Art. 68 CC 
and Art. 66 CC, which allows for written resolutions, where all members agree. As to the 
conduct of the assembly and tb.e voting procedure, tb.e code is equally very general. 
According to Art. 67 par. 1 CC «all members have equal voting rights at the gener:tl 
assembly » and according to par. 2 of the same rule « resolurions require a majority of the 
votes of the members present >>. 
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So, what do the sentences « all members have equal voting rights at the general 
assembly » and « resolutions require a majority of the votes of the members present » 
mean and which procedural rules have to be applied to the general assembly ? In 
parti.cular : are ID.formal decision-making procedw:es, such as voting by acclairn possible ? 
In the fust patt, we will lock at the rules which ensure the correct resolution-taking and 
elections at the assembly. These rules cover the proper nocice rules and the rules regarding 
the voting procedure. In the second part, we will lock at the legal consequences if formal 
decision-making rules a.re violated, whether such resoluti.ons would have to be challenged 
in court according to Art. 75 CC or if they are nun and void. 
II. Rules regarding the taking of resolutions 
A. Proper N otice 
Art. 67 par. 3 CC provides : « Resolutions ma.y be taken on matters for which 
proper notice has not been given only where this is expressly perm.itted by the statutes ». 
Tue rule tb.at there must either be a proper notice or tbat such vote must be exp:r:essly 
permitted in the Statutes is a mandatory rule1• 
The :r:equirement of the «proper notice » is necessary to ena.ble the members of the 
associacion to prepare themselves for the general assembly and also to decide whether they 
want to attend and participate in the resolucion-making of the association: « [F]erner gehb"rt 
Zflm Stimm- und Wahlrecht auch das Recht Zflm Entscheid darüber, ob die Teilnahme an der 
Ver.rammlung überhaupt eforderlich sei, d.h. ob das Stimm- und Wahlrecht im Einze!faD überhaupt 
ausgeübt werden solle oder m"cht. Da aU dies nur mb'glich ist, wenn das einzelne V erein.rmitglied im vorau.r 
weiss, woriiber in einer bestimmten Versammlung entschieden werden soll, statuiert das Gesetz eine Pflicht 
des Vereins Zf1 gehb"riger Ankündigung der diesbezflglichen «Gegenstände J>, d.h. Traktanden »2• 
Tue «proper nocice » is a fundamental procedu:r:al cond.ition for decision-making 
by the gen.eral assernbly. The rules regarding «proper nocice » allow only one excepcion, 
which is that proper nocice is not needed « where this is expressly permitted by the 
statutes » (.A.rt. 67 par. 3 cq. The term « exp:r:essly » shows tbat an implicit reference is not 
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enough. The correct decision-making procedu:r:e of the association requires tbat the 
rnembers be made aware of upconling votes by eithe:r: a proper notice or by a clear and 
express nenn in the statutes3. 
Both the statuto:r:y :r:ules and the notice must be of such nature tbat they illow the 
member to decide if s/he wants to attend the general assembly. Tue rules are .intended to 
prevent ambush-motions, which come une..-xpectedly. AJ1 members must be able to decide 
informed on whether they want to participate in the resolucion-rnaking process and must 
have the opportunity to prepare. 
The notice :r:ule also applies to adjou:r:runents. If a vote is adjourned, the members 
must be informed on the agenda item under which the vote would take place. If no precise 
timing is announced, for example by announcing tbat the agenda item will be discussed 
« later », the adjourrunent is defective for notice purposes as the members are not in a 
position to know when, if at all, the item would be brought before the gene:r:al assernbly. 
An illl.defined postponement is not a valid rescheduling. 
Furthermore, in accordance witb. the general rules, the adjoumment of certain 
points in the agenda, must be for valid reasons and may not be made arbitrarily4. 
B. Proper Conduct of the Assembly 
1. General remarks, applicable rules 
Apart f:r:om the sentence : « Resolutions require a rnajority of the votes of the 
members present » in Art. 67 par. 2 CC and the notice :r:ules in .A.rt. 67 par. 3 CC the Civil 
Code contains no :r:ules on the conduct of the assembly and on how the voting procedu:r:e 
has to be conducted. A reason for tbis absence is the streng reference in association law to 
the principle of democracy. This principle can be seen in two ways : first the Civil Code 
refers to it e..'q>licitly in Art. 67 par. 1 CC («All mernbers have equal voting rights at the 
general assembly ») and second, by recalling the democratic envirorunent in Switzetland 
when the associ:ition law was codified as a federal law in 1912. Fo:r: this reason, the rules 
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regarding the taking of resolutions whicb are applicable for example to tow:n-meetings or 
other public democrat:ic institutions can be applied to the gene:ral assembly by analogys. 
Even if the topic of the resolution is propetly notified, the participants of the 
general assembly ha.ve to be made aware, that a resolution will be taken. « V o-r der 
Abstimmung verschafft sich der Vorsitzende eine Übersicht über die Anträge und schllJgt die Rciheefolgc, 
nach denm er abstimmen Jassen will, vor»6• Tue election procedure is a formal procedure. The 
cb.airperson must announce that a vote will take phtce ; tb.is is so all members are aware of 
the planned vote and can (for C.'Cample) tequest a secret vote if they object to an open 
vote: «Ohne anderslautende Statutenbestimmungen werden Wahlen und Abstimmungen offen 
dttrchgefahrt. Meist wird diese durch Handaqfbeben oder durch Aefstehen erfa!gen. Ein Ordnungsantrag 
aef Durchßihnmg einer geheimen Wahl oder geheimen Ab.rtimmung mit Stimmzetteln kann aber jederz.eit 
gestellt werden »7. Some members might not always be in the assembly-room at the time and 
therefore the a.nnouncement of the vote should be made at some point beforehand, so 
that everybody can prepare for the vote8• Tbis is especially the case if the voting follows 
len.gthy discussions. 
2. Voting « /Jy acc!aim ;; ? 
Oftentimes, especially in sm.aller associations, the resolutions are not mken by a 
formal counting of votes, but « by acclaim ». A vote « by acclaim » means that instead of 
voting ~o.mully the m.embers signal their consent inclirectly, usually by applause (hence the 
tenn « by acclaim >>). 
Tbis practice raises the question, whether such voting by acclaim. is permitted 
u.nder Swiss law and if it can replace formal resoluti.on-taki.ng ? If we analyze this « voting 
by accl.a.im >~practice in dept.h, we see that the so-called « voting by acclaim » is in fact not 
a form of voting, but only a form of acknowledging uru.nim.ity. It can only replace a 
formal voting process, for example in an election, if there is only one candic:hte and there 
is no necessity to formally elect such candidate or if all members are unanimous. A vote 
« by acclaim. » cannot replace an election : « E.r finden keine eigentlichen Wahlen statt,- .rtattde.s.ren 
werden die Richter[. .. ] nur ZJf!' Akklamation VO'(g,etchlagen »9, 
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Acclaim. is in condusion not a form of voting in a democratic organization, but a 
reference to the absence of a demOcratic vote, which iS permissible, if there is only one 
candidate or if all members are unanimous. 
An acclairn is therefore only relevant, when it mkes place in the conto..'t of a proper 
election or voting procedure and if unanimity is given. To argue for exarnple, that applause 
after the presentation of names of candidates can be an election by acclaim is certainly 
W'!ong. « Voting by acclaim » .thus works the same way as «normal» voting ; the only 
difference is that there is no counting of votes, because everybody agrees. U sually the 
president asks the assembly if anyone objects to a vote by acclaim. If somebody objects, a 
formal election has to take place, secret or open, depending on the rules set up within the 
association. This is also true, if no other objections are raised and if it is clear that a vast 
m.ajority of the members consent. The reason for this is not only to ensure that all 
members ca:n e..'i:ercise their membership-rights properly but also to ensure 
unambiguousness, which is necessary corollary to right to challenge a resoluti.on in court 
found in Art. 75 cc10. 
3. Consent by si!ence ? 
The democratic principle requires that procedural rules are adhered to a:nd that 
roinorities can make their point in an effort to convince the potential majority of their 
ideas. The consent of each member to a specific decision can therefore only be assumed, if 
all members had the opportunity to signify their approval expressly through a legal and 
statutory procedure. For this reason, silence among the members after the question by the 
chairperson, « if anyone objects » can only be construed as unrutim.ity if it is cleatly beyond 
doubt that all members are aware, that their silence will have this effect. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the chairperson not only asks in tbis situation, whether « anyone objects », 
but also, that members are informed of the consequences of their silence and that any 
objection, even if only from one member, would necessitate a formal vote. 
4. Ambiguous situations 
According to Art. 75 CC each member has the right to challenge the resolution of 
the general assembly within one month of learning thereof. If, for example, the 
chairperson does not conduct a formal vote, but assumes an agreement by « acclaim » or 
another form of tacit approval, it is often unclear, whether there is a resolution of the 
10 See infra II.B.4. 
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assembly (the voting by « accl.airn »; whi.ch would trigger the one montb. pe.riod. of Art. 75 
CC) or if instead it is a decision by the chairperson (that a formal vote would not be 
necessary) ; the latter of which would have to be ch:allenged intemally within the 
association before goiog to court. 
The wording in Art 75 CC « Any member who has not consented to a resolution 
[ ... ] » also shows, that informal resolution-t:aking, such as votes by acclaim are only 
pennissible, if all members agree to thls informal procedure. If such informal proc~edures 
were penni.ssible even in the face of minority disagreement, the right-of the minority to 
challenge such resolutions would be frustrated. They would not know if they have to 
challenge a decision of the chairperson (intemally Vlithin the association) or whether they 
would have to go to court, which in sports often means that they have to initiate a CAS-
procedure. Tue right to challenge resolutions of the assembly thus requires formally 
correct and uruunbiguous situations. 
III. Nullity or voidability 
A. General remarks 
If a resolution by the general assembly violates procedural or substantive law, the 
resolution is either « voidable >) or « null and void ». The difference between « voidable )) 
and <<null and void » refers to the rule of J\.rt. 75 CC, which entitles any member « to 
lega.lly challenge, within a month of the day of which he had notice of it, the decisions 
which [ ... ] are contraty to law or the statutes of the associati.on »11. If the resolution is null 
and void, its nullity can be raised at any time, even if the one-month period of Art. 75 CC 
has lapsed: «Die zentrale Bedeutung der fraglichen Unterscheidung liegt darin, dass aefechtbare 
Beschlüsse nath Ablaef der einmonatigen Aefechtungifrist fair den Verein und seine Mitglieder verbind!ith 
sind bZJV. der Mangel "geheilt" ist, während bei nichtigen Beschlüssen dieser Rechtsmangel auch noch 
später geltend gemacht werden kann »12. 
A resolution of the general assembly is null and void, if it is :tlflicted with a severe 
deficiency, both procedural or substantive: «AefNichtigkeit ist indetsen Zfl erkennen, wenn ein 
Beschluss mit schwerwiegenden Mi:'ngeln behaftet ist, sei es in farmeUer oder materieUer Hinsicht ))13. 
11 See refecing to the voidll.bility of the resolution BSK ZGB I-HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n. [!],Art. 75 N 22; 
ulso BK-RlEMER, supra n. {1}, Art. 75 N 62. 
12 BK-RlEMER, mpta n. [1], Art. 75 N 62. 
13 HE.00 ANTON/PORTMA.. .... 'N WoLFGANG/SEEMAl'-."N MA'ITH.TAS, Grundriss des Vei:einsrechts, "ufgrund 
des 2005 erschienenen We:tks: Das Schweizerische Vei:eio.srecht, Basel 2009, N 230. 
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The one-month period of Art. 75 CC is rather short In Swiss domestic situations, 
which the legislator had in mind. in 1912 when the · norm was issued, the period is 
sufficient as the deadline is often easily met without great expense by a simple request for 
a settlement meeting ; the typical form of dispute resolution in this situation. In rehtion to 
international sports associations, however, the one-month-term is very sho:rt, when one 
considers that the resolution may have to be challenged at the CAS, and that the member 
( clairnant) must also determine whether it wants to take the financia.1 risk of such a 
procedure. 
B. Violation of proper notice rules 
It is generally accepted tbat the most severe deficiencies are those affecting the 
decis.ion-maki.ng ability of the association. In these cases, parti.cularly, if some members are 
not invited to or barred from parti.cipating in the assembly, the resolution is null and void. 
The same applies if the executive body withholds informacion which is necessary for 
members to exercise their voting rights effectivelyl4, 
It has been shown that the correct decision-m.ä.king of the association requires that 
the members are made aware of upcoming votes by either a proper notice or by a clear 
and express norm in the statutes15. 'Whether the members are not invited, or barred from 
parricipating, or whether a resolution ta.kes place which has not been notified at all or 
which is not foreseen by an {:)..'Press norm in the statutes, the effect is the same : the 
resolution is null and void16• It cannot make a difference whether the member is barred by 
physical force from attending the assembly or whether she/he is deceived, for example led 
to believe no or no more elections would ta.ke place or that no more resolutions would be 
presented for voting. 
C. «Non-Resolutions»? 
lt has been shown, that informal fonns of resolutions, especially votes by 
« acclaim » are only relevant, if they take place in the context of a proper election or voti.ng 
procedure and if unaoimity is given. If this is not the case, there is no resolution at all ; we 
may refer to these as << non-resolutions )). « Non-resolutions » are by definition «null a.nd 
void » and not « voidable », they are not « resolutions )) which would ha.ve to be challenged 
14 HEJNI/PORTMN:m/SEEMANN, supra n. [13), N 231; BSK ZGB 1-HEINI/SCHERRER, mpra n. {1), Art. 75 
N36. 
15 BK-RIEMER., supra n. {/),Art. 67 N 73. 
16 Id., Art. 75 N 96. 
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in court. Tbis is for e:x:runple the case, if the resoluti.on is not milde by a formal ge:neral 
assembly, but by an informal meeti.ng of members17. 
If we bave an ambiguous situation ts where it is unclear, whether there is a 
resolution of the assembly (which would tcigger the one month period of .Art. 75 CC) or a 
decision by the chairperson, which would have to be chillenged internally, we have to 
assume nullity, not voidability. It cannot be that a member bas to bear the risks a.rising 
from runbiguous situations for which that member was not responsible. This is especially 
t:rue in international sports federations, which have access to leg.tl cou:nsel regarding the 
conduct of the assembly and where a preventi.ve challenge in court or at the CAS would be 
costly and time-consuming. 
Tue rules which assume nullity if proper notice requirements are 'Violated, also bave 
the functi.on of controlling the executive body of the association by creating a streng 
incentive to adhere to these formal rules19. Nullity is also a sanction. Tue same is true in 
rela.tion to « non-resolutions ». Here too, the consequence of nullity ha.s the functi.on to 
assure compliance Viri.th formal rules on resoluti.on-taking; includi.ng the avoidance of 
ambiguous situations which factually deprive the members of the.ir right to challenge a 
resoluti.on, since they cannot dete:o:nine, if they bave to challenge a decision of the 
chairperson (lnternally) or whether they would bave to go to court. 
D. Further Issues 
1. Only voidable if there thubt about nulli!J ? 
Since nullity is a stricter sanction than simply rendering the resolution voidable, it 
could be argued that if there is any doubt as to whether a decision is to be considered as 
capable of being challenged or as null and void, the form.er should be preferred. It is true 
that the threshold to assume nullity is higher than the threshold to assume that a decision 
is capable of being challenged. It is the logic of this statement that if the threshold to 
assume nullity is not met, the decision is capable of being challenged. But if, on balance, 
the decision-maker finds that the threshold for nullity is met, it is not correct to assume 
that the decision is only challengeable, only because the decision-maker is only 99°/o (and 
not 100o/o) sure about nullity. 
17 BSK ZGB I-HEINI/SCHERRER, supra 11. [!),Art. 75 N 36. 
18 See supra II.BA. 
19 HElNI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra 11. (13), N 214 - 216; regru:cling limi.ted companies :M:E.IER-HAYOZ 
AR'I'HUR/FoRS"I'MOSER PETER, Schweizerisches Gesellsch:i.ftsrecht, 10, Aufl., Bcm 2007, § 16 N 183. 
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2. Claiming nulli!J as acting against good faith ? 
Often, the members which are present at the assembly realise that procedural rules 
are not met, but decide to remain silent, for var:ious reasons. First, in the case of 
mandatory rules, the principle of venire contra factum proprium is not applicable : it is not 
acting ag-ainst good faith, if somebody later asserts that a certain clause in an agreement is 
null and void even if that person previously signed the agreement20. If f~r example the 
alleged decision of the general assembly is null and void for non-compliance Viri.th 
Article 67 para. 3 CC, which is a mandatory rule, the principle of venire contra factum proprium 
is not applicable. 
Second, the previous behavior must be clear, to make the principle of venire contra 
factum proprium relevant. If a member has not e.'\.-plicitly expressed his/her [dis]approval of 
the decision taken (but has perhaps simply remained silent), it cannot be concluded f:rom 
this alone that she/he agrees Viri.th tb.e decision taken by acclamation. Such a member is 
enti.tled to claim nullity; only if no member objected.when asked by the chairperson, if 
there was uruutim.ity would the silence deprive a later claim of nullity. If only one member 
p:rotests tb.at the conditi.ons for a resolutlon by acclaim are not met, any and each member 
can claim nullity, even that member remained silent at the meeting. Not to make any 
objecrions alone is not a «factum propium ». 
Furth.er, there needs to bave been detrimental reliance by the opposing party. A 
customary practice Viri.tb.in tb.e association can only be assumed if it has been applied over 
many years and if such practi.ce is acknowledged by all involved parties (opinio nece.rsita#s) 21• 
In any event such a customary pracrice cannot contradict the statutes, unless reliance on 
the wording of the Statutes would be abusive22 • 
3. Principle of Proportionali!J 
Tue principle of proportionality means that a legal consequence must be 
reasona.ble, considering the competing interests of the other party. Although this is a 
principle of public law, it can als.o be applicable in private lawn. Its application to this 
question would necessiute an analysis of the interests at band and relating them to each 
other. If, for example, the interests of the claimant are small, but the damage which would 
20 HONSELL HEINRICH, &.sler Kommenw, ZMlgesetzbuch I, Art. 1 - 456 ZGB, Honsell Heinrich et 
nl (H:tsg.), 4. Aufl., :&se.12010,Art. 2N 44. 
21 HElNI/PORTMANN/SE&~, supra n. {13), N 56 ; RUSCH ARNOLD, Observ:l.Xl.Z und Übung, E...'"Wlrlcung 
und Rechtsschein,Juslettet 18. September 2006, Rz. 18. 
22 HElN'I/PoRT.MANN/SE.E."0'ANN, .mpra 11. [! 3], N 56. 
23 BSK ZGB I-HüNSEU., supra n. [20], Art. 2 N 21. 
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occur to the association jf the alleged resoluti.on was found to be null and void would be 
large, tb.e principle of proportiorutlity would weigh the two interests and - a:nd if the 
interests of the claima:nt are disproportionate - deny nullity. 
However we must include all interests at hand in this analysis. If the nullity also 
serves as a sancti.on24 for non-compliance with formal rules regarding the taking of 
resoluti.ons, we not only :relate the personal interests of the claima:nt to the damage of the 
associarion if nullity is assurned, but also the general interest of the law that formal rules 
on resoluti.on-taking should be obse:rved. 
4. Standing 
Each membe:r o:r member feden.tion has sta:nding to ensure that an associati.on's 
intemal rules and regulations regarding its decision-m.aking and intemal gove:rru..nce are 
enforced and that the decision-making of the general assembly is compliant with statutory 
rules and the member's membership (voting-) rights are respected. 
Moreover, as a matter of Swiss law standi.ng wOuld not be an issue jf the decision is 
null and void. The allegation that a decision is null a:nd void can be raised by any member 
at any time, even if the member has previously adhered to the decision25. The only limits 
are set in tb.e rules regarcling the « abuse of rights » ; such a situation could be assumed, if 
for example the person, who is responsible for the nullity (for example as then-
chairperson of the general assembly) claims nullity while all other members want the 
resoluti.on to stand. 
5. fulation to &le 49 ef the CAS-Code 
According to rule R49, Time limit for Appeal, of the CAS-Code, the « limit for 
appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against ». In a 
recent decision2G the CAS has ruled that the rule R49 applies even if the decision at stake is 
null and void. The CAS assumes that the rule, whereby nullity can be claimed at any time, 
is a procedu:ral rule, which is superseded by the arbitrati.on rules. This conclusion is - at 
least - questionable. The rules on nullity are not procedu:ral rules, but substantive law. If 
the CAS does not ad.mit claims :regarding nullity after more than 21 days following the null 
and void resoluti.on, the questions arises, whether ordiruuy courts would have to step in. 
24 SceS1PraCandD.1. 
25 HED.1/PORTh!'JiNN/SEEMANN, supra n. {13),N 229; BK~RIEMER, supra n. [!],Art. 75 N 125 -127. 
26 CAS 2011/ A/2360 English Chess Fed=tion & Georgia.n Chess Fedemtion vs. FIDE 
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IV: Conclusion 
Informal voting such as voting by acclairn in gene.ral assernblies of sports 
associations is in conclusion not a form of voting in :in assocffition. Rather it is a reference 
to the absence of a democrati.c vote, which is permissible, if there is only one candidate or 
if all members are una.ni.mous. A « vote by acclaim » is therefore only relevant, when it 
takes phce in the conte.~t of a proper election or voting procedu:re and if unanimity is 
given. 
Silence among the members after the question by the chairperson, « if anyone 
objects >~ can ooly be construed as unanim.ity if it is clear and beyond doubt, that all 
members are fully aware of the effect that thei:t silence will have. For tbis reason, it is also 
necessa.ry, that the chairperson informs the members of the consequences of their silence 
and that that any objection, even if ooly from one member, would necessitate a formal 
vote. 
« Resolutions by accla.im » which are not compliant with these conditions are null 
and void. 'Ibis means that they don't have to be challenged according to Art. 75 CC. 
Consequently if the resolution is null and void, its nullity ein be asserted at a:ny time, even 
if the one-month period of Art. 75 CC has lapsed, and each member of the assochtion has 
standing to commence the appropriate proceedings. 
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